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THE BRENNAN LEGACY:
TIE ART OF JUDGING
Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert*
I. INTRODUCTION
What does ajudge do when he or she decides a case?
Benjamin Cardozo posed this question in 1921 and answered it
in what has become a classic of American legal literature, The Na-
ture of the Judicial Process.' Drawing from his wealth of scholar-
ship and experience as Chief Judge of the New York Court of Ap-
peals, he described the ingredients that enter "that strange compound
which is brewed daily in the caldron of the courts."2  Cardozo's
analysis and philosophy examined the accepted definition of the ju-
dicial process: What courts do and should do, and how judges rea-
son and should reason in deciding particular cases.
3
We paraphrase the broad question put by Cardozo three-quarters
of a century ago and attempt to answer these questions:
What did William J. Brennan, Jr. do when he decided a case?
What was the Brennan "Art of Judging?"
Is there a legacy from this art and, if so, who are its beneficiar-
ies?
Before we consider these questions, however, we must seek to
understand the Brennan philosophy of law. To do this, we must first
distinguish between the philosophy of law in general and a philoso-
phy of law.
* Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1949).
2. Id. at 10.
3. See H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The
Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REv. 969, 969 (1977).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Distinctions Between "the" Philosophy of Law and "a"
Philosophy of Law
The philosophy of law is a broad inquiry into what the relation-
ship between people in society and between people and government
ought to be. Legal philosophy examines the chief ideas that are
common to rules and methods of law in the sense described by
Roscoe Pound: "[A] body of philosophical, political, economic, and
ethical ideas as to the end of law .... It is an inquiry into those
elements that are common to all judicial systems, and a search for the
universal concept of law, a study that goes beyond the particularities
of individual systems, past or present-in the various states of the
United States, the federal experience, or other countries. Legal phi-
losophy deals with the various disciplines that bear directly on the
solution to a galaxy of problems: inquiries into intricacies of termi-
nology, legal methods, the role of precedent, statutory interpretation,
underlying rationale, the use of different types of authority, the effi-
cacy of various controls and their operation in diverse factual sce-
narios, and the basic issues concerning the values that are imple-
mented.
On the other hand, a legal philosophy addresses the specific an-
swers to these queries. These answers come from respectable think-
ers, both in academia and on the bench, and each articulates, or at
least demonstrates, some particular legal philosophy. A legal phi-
losophy is expressed in the form of a quest for justice; a need to de-
clare the law as it should be. Giorgio Del Vecchio explained that a
"[p]hilosophy of Law seeks precisely that which must or ought to be
in Law, in contrast to that which is, bringing an ideal truth into com-
parison with an empirical reality (deontology-science of what ought
to be).
' 5
4. ROSCOE POUND, I JURISPRUDENCE 363 (1959).
5. GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4 (Thomas Owen Martin
trans., Catholic Univ. of America Press 8th ed. 1953) (1930) ("Philosophy of
law is the course of study which defines Law in its logical universality, seeks
its origins and the general characteristics of its historical development, and
evaluates it according to the ideal ofjustice drawn from pure reason.").
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III. BRENNAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND ITS ORIGINS
Justice Brennan's philosophy was clear cut and easily identifi-
able. Whether it is capable of simple definition is problematic, but I
am attracted to a statement by Professor Harry W. Jones, the late
Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia Law School, which
I believe accurately describes Justice Brennan's philosophy of law:
Law is not a form of art for art's sake; its ends-in-view are
social, nothing more and nothing less than the establish-
ment and maintenance of a social environment in which the
quality of human life can be spirited, improving and unim-
paired.6
But having a philosophy is not enough. Philosophers often offer
ambitious programs to advance the cause of social progress, but
these programs cannot succeed in the courts until and unless they
take hold in the judge's imagination. To implement his or her phi-
losophy, a judge must fashion, in Holmes' words, the "implements of
decision."
7
Justice Brennan found these implements, or shall we say a
methodology of decision-making and decision-justifying, in the
teachings of this century's great American legal philosophers-
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and Benjamin N. Cardozo.
I believe that each of these great legal philosophers was influ-
enced by Rudolf Von Jhering, the founder and leader in Germany of
social utilitarians in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Von
Jhering preached that it was not enough for a jurist to know that law
is a development. He or she must also perceive how the law devel-
oped, for what purposes it developed, and to what end.8 He broke
with the prevailing Begriffsjurisprudenz, or "jurisprudence of con-
ceptions." 9 Applying the "jurisprudence of conceptions," the judge
6. Harry W. Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
1023, 1025 (1974).
7. John W. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 896
(1940).
8. See 1 RUDOLF VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 9-10, 271-
77 (Isaac Husik trans., 1968) (1903).
9. HENDRIK JAN VAN EIKEMA HOMMES, MAJOR TRENDS IN THE HISTORY
OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 214-15 (1979); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 610 (1908).
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deduced the decision in every case by a purely mechanical-logical
process.' 0 Von Jhering rejected this and instead called for what he
termed Wirklichkeitsjurisprudenz, or "a jurisprudence of results," in
which legal precepts would be tested by their results-their practical
application-rather than by logical deduction alone."I
In a trilogy of memorable lectures delivered from 1897 to 1921,
Holmes, Pound, and Cardozo drew upon Von Jhering's theory, and
legitimized a methodology for use in the twin elements of the judi-
cial process-the process of decision and the process of justification.
The first of the trilogy was Holmes' 1897 lecture, The Path of the
Law, 12 delivered at the dedication of the new hall at Boston Univer-
sity, in which Holmes stated:
I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to
recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social
advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the of-
ten proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such consid-
erations is simply to leave the very ground and foundation
of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious .... 13
Likewise, at the beginning of the century, Roscoe Pound advo-
cated pragmatism as a legitimate philosophy of law.' 4 He decried the
conceptual jurisprudence of our system, the slavish adherence to
precedents and the rules and principles derived therefrom.' 5 In a
1906 address to the American Bar Association in St. Paul, Minne-
sota, Pound sounded a call for the end of what he called mechanical
jurisprudence: "The most important and most constant cause of dis-
satisfaction with all law at all times is to be found in the necessarily
mechanical operation of legal rules."'16 Pound trumpeted a theme
more softly played by Holmes a decade earlier-that the social
10. See HOMMES, supra note 9, at 212-14.
11. See id. at 215; Pound, supra note 9, at 610.
12. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457
(1897).
13. Id. at 467.
14. See Pound, supra note 9, at 609.
15. See id. at 614-21.
16. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Admini-
stration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REv. 729, 731 (1906), reprinted in 8 BAYLOR L.
REv. 1, 8 (1956).
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consequences of a court's decisions were legitimate considerations in
decision-making.
17
Cardozo delivered The Nature of the Judicial Process'8 at the
1921 Storrs lectures at Yale. He espoused what he called the method
of sociology: "The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The
rule that misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence."'
19
To address novel questions of law, Cardozo said that judges must
turn to the social welfare, defined "as public policy, the good of the
collective body," or "the social gain that is wrought by adherence to
the standards of right conduct, which find expression in the mores of
the community."
20
Thus, Holmes, Pound and Cardozo laid the basis for modem ju-
risprudence: Judges should consider the effect of their judicial deci-
sions on society and social welfare, rather than adhering solely to a
mechanical jurisprudence of legal conceptions. Professor Calvin
Woodard, the great legal philosopher from the University of Vir-
ginia, suggests that this theory draws on Jeremy Bentham's utilitar-
ian thesis:
[T]he advocates of Sociological Jurisprudence seized upon
this aspect of Bentham's message. Like him, they insisted
that law has a practical, real world moral purpose, though
they defined that purpose more in terms of social justice,
and the balancing of social interests, than [Bentham's] "the
greatest happiness of the greatest number."
21
The underpinnings of what has been called the sociological
method run counter to the widely-held notion that only the legislative
branch of government should formulate and promulgate public pol-
icy. A substantial body of thinking argues that, in a representative
democracy, law-making authority should not extend to judges but
should be restricted to legislators, who are openly responsible to the
electorate. 22 The major premise of this body of thinking is an
17. See Holmes, supra note 12, at 468-74.
18. CARDOZO, supra note 1.
19. Id. at 66.
20. Id. at 72.
21. Calvin Woodard, Thoughts on the Interplay Between Morality and Law
in Modern Legal Thought, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 784, 795 (1989).
22. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and
the Interprative Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv.
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attractive populist argument that the people, those intimately affected
by the promulgation of law, should have the right to endorse or reject
the voting record of the law-maker every two, four or six years.
23
Facially, the argument is persuasive. Yet, when a state court in-
vents "the law of products liability, abolishes sovereign, or charitable
tort immunity, redefines the insanity defense, or restricts the range of
self-exculpation in contracts of adhesion, its action is rarely attacked
as undemocratic. 24 It was not until the Supreme Court began the
process of selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 25 holding the states to higher standards of
responsibility to their inhabitants, that we began to experience the
heated public discussions on the jurisprudential ideologies of our
judges.
Ample authority supports the law-making function of courts that
operate in the common law tradition. There seem to be few limits to
changing judge-made law because, as Cardozo stated:
A rule which in its origin was the creation of the courts
themselves, and was supposed in the making to express the
mores of the day, may be abrogated by the courts when the
mores have so changed that perpetuation of the rule would
do violence to the social conscience .... This is not usur-
pation. It is not even innovation. It is the reservation for
ourselves of the same power of creation that built up the
common law through its exercise by the judges of the
past.26
This brings us to William J. Brennan, Jr., a modem day legal
philosopher, who not only accepted the philosophy of Holmes,
Pound, and Cardozo, but also extended it. This extension is what I
761, 772-73 & n.48 (1989).
23. See id.
24. Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J.
227, 248 (1972).
25. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding a criminal
defendant is entitled to a jury trial in state courts by virtue of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding
that a state court judge's instruction to the jury that they may infer the defen-
dant's guilt from his refusal to testify violates the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
26. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 136-37 (1924).
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perceive to be the cornerstone of any discussion on "The Brennan
Legacy: The Art of Judging."
IV. THE BRENNAN "ART OF JUDGING"
Although Holmes, Pound, and Cardozo applied the sociological
method only to novel questions of law,27 Brennan applied it to settled
precepts that he felt no longer kept pace with evolving community
moral standards. 28 He liked to apply what Pound described as a
"standard": a legal or moral precept expressing "general limits of
permissible conduct to be applied to the circumstances of each
case."29 Professor Karl Llewellyn once said that standards "seem to
be those vague but useful pictures with which one approaches a wide
and varied field of conduct to measure the rights of a particular
situation .... ,30
What were these generous, vague, and useful pictures to which
Justice Brennan turned? Two of them were found in the Constitu-
tion-the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Brennan thereby initi-
ated the "First Amendmentization" and the "Fourteenth Amendmen-
tization" of our society. Others were found in Brennan's eclectic
methods of construing statutes. He did not hold fealty to any par-
ticular method of statutory interpretation. He did not limit himself to
the old order of the "Mischief Rule"31 announced in the sixteenth
27. See supra text accompanying notes 12-20.
28. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
29. Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of
Law, 7 TUL. L. REV. 475,485 (1933).
30. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30
COLUM. L. REv. 431, 434 (1930).
31. "[For the sure and true ... interpretation of all statutes in general,"
certain things must be discerned, namely "[w]hat was the common law before
the making of the Act ... [and] what was the mischief and defect for which the
common law did not provide." Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex.
1584).
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century Heydon's Case,32 or the "Golden Rule" 33 or the "Literal
Rule"34 of Lord Atkinson.
Rather, to achieve his desired objective, Justice Brennan would
apply "Intentionalism," "Literalism," "Textualism," and "Purposiv-
ism," or any combination thereof,35 so long as he could reach the re-
sult he wanted. The Brennan polestar was to decide a case by con-
siderations of public policy or social welfare so that "the quality of
human life can be spirited, improving and unimpaired., 36 In so do-
ing, he pulled down thunder from the sky with precedent-shattering
decisions.
A. Brennan's Decision-Making and Decision-Justifying
Methodology: His Legacy and Its Intended Beneficiaries
Justice Brennan was devoted to individual freedom and a desire
to advance social welfare for those traditionally disempowered:
Prisoners, minorities and the poor. His moral values were most visi-
bly displayed in opinions that addressed the Civil Rights movement
in the South. Thus, in Baker v. Carr,37 he distinguished a line of
Guaranty Clause cases in order to permit judicial review of a state
apportionment scheme-typical of those that existed in the South
32. Id.
33. "[G]iv[e] the words their ordinary signification, unless when so applied
they produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience .... ." River
Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson, 2 App. Cas. 743, 764 (H.L. 1877) (Blackburn,
L.J.).
34. "If the language of a statute be plain, admitting of one meaning... it
... must be enforced though it should lead to absurd or mischievous results."
Vacher & Sons, Ltd. v. London Soc'y of Compositors, I App. Cas. 107, 121
(H.L. 1912) (Atkinson, L.J.).
35. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: TEXT, MATERIALS
AND CASES 193-312 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining "Intentionalism" as a rule of
interpretation that ascertains legislative intent; "Literalism" as Lord Atkinson's
"Literal Rule" from Vacher & Sons, Ltd. v. London Soc'y of Compositors, 1
App. Cas. 107, 121 (H.L. 1912); "Textualism" as the "Golden Rule" from
River Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson, 2 App. Cas. 743, 764 (H.L. 1877); and
"Purposivism" as analogous to the "Mischief Rule" in Heydon's Case, 76 Eng.
Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584)).
36. Jones, supra note 6, at 1025.
37. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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during the 1950s and 1960s-in which the voting power of minori-
ties was significantly diluted. By phrasing the issue as one concern-
ing equal protection rather than the Guaranty Clause,3 8 Justice Bren-
nan was able to convince six of his colleagues on the Court that a
traditionally unreviewable area of law was, in fact, justiciable.
39
Similarly, the Civil Rights movement provided Brennan a fo-
rum for the significant expansion of the First Amendment. In New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,4 0 an Alabama police commissioner
brought a libel claim against the newspaper and signatories to a paid
editorial advertisement critical of police action aimed at preventing
black citizens from exercising their right to vote.4' If the common
law had been applied, the Court would have been required to find in
favor of Sullivan on the basis of libel per se. Justice Brennan re-
jected that outcome and held that in order to maintain the viability of
open and robust debate, the First Amendment must extend to protect
criticisms of public officials made without "actual malice." 42 Any
contrary approach would "[impose] fear and timidity.., upon those
who would give voice to public criticism." 43 He wrote: "The rule
[of libel per se] thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of pub-
lic debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." 44 Therefore, he sounded the death knell for the centuries old
defamation law insofar as public officials were concerned.
Although political patronage was an active part of the American
political process at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, Justice
Brennan decided, 200 years after the Declaration of Independence,
that political patronage violated the First Amendment. In Elrod v.
Burns,4 5 he declared that "[t]he cost of the practice of patronage is
the restraint it places on freedoms of belief and association." 46 in
this case the First Amendment triumphed.47 Twenty years later,
38. See id. at 226-27.
39. See id. at 237, 266.
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. See id. at 256.
42. See id. at 279-80.
43. Id. at 278.
44. Id. at 279.
45. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
46. Id. at 355.
47. See id. at 373 (holding that the practice of patronage dismissals is un-
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however, the question remains whether a society is better off having
strong political parties endowed with a patronage base, or adhering
to the modem concept that voters should choose the best candidate
that money can buy.
In Fay v. Noia,48 Justice Brennan championed the rights of pris-
oners by expanding the scope of federal habeas corpus review,
holding that the petitioner's failure to exhaust state court remedies
did not preclude federal review of his habeas petition.49 The peti-
tioner and two co-defendants had been convicted on the basis of ille-
gally obtained confessions.50 Fearing the prospect of the death pen-
alty if his conviction was vacated and a new trial ordered, Noia chose
to forego appeal of his life sentence.51 The co-defendants, however,
appealed and were subsequently released from custody.5 2 Twenty
years after his conviction, Noia sought habeas relief 5 3 Even though
Brennan's view is no longer accepted,5 4 to identify his legacy today,
we should consider the language he used at that time: "For such
anomalies, such affronts to the conscience of a civilized society, ha-
beas corpus is predestined by its historical role in the struggle for
personal liberty to be the ultimate remedy. If the States withhold ef-
fective remedy, the federal courts have the power and the duty to
provide it."
55
Perhaps Justice Brennan's desire to reach what he considered a
just and socially responsible outcome is best depicted in United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber,56 a case that interpreted Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the context of a private, voluntary
race-conscious affirmative action plan.5 7 Justice Brennan recognized
that the argument of both the company and the union was based on
the statutory language that "[I]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for any employer [or] labor organization... to discriminate
constitutional under the First and Fourtheenth Amendments).
48. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
49. See id. at 398, 399.
50. See id. at 395.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 397 n.3.
54. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
55. Fay, 372 U.S. at 441.
56. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
57. See id. at 193.
682
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against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin ...... 58 He rejected the statute's plain language and re-
sorted to snippets of Title VII's legislative history, concluding that
the affirmative action plan followed by the employer and the union
did not violate the statute by giving employment preferences to
blacks.59 Justice Brennan wrote:
It is a "familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of
the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.". . . The
prohibition against racial discrimination in . . Title VII
must therefore be read against the background of the legis-
lative history of Title VII and the historical context from
which the Act arose . . . . Examination of those sources
makes clear that an interpretation of the sections that for-
bade all race-conscious affirmative action would "bring
about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the
statute" and must be rejected.6 °
Thus, although he recognized that adherence to the language of
the statute would dictate a different result, he looked beyond the stat-
ute to portions of the legislative history and found a way to reach
what he considered the socially desirable result.
61
However, in an attempt to reach a "socially desirable result,"
Justice Brennan preferred Emerson's description of hobgoblins and
little minds62 and refused to become a slave to consistency. This is
especially true in his references to the state judiciary. Dissenting in
Stone v. Powell,63 he believed that federal habeas corpus review was
necessary even in claims based on Fourth Amendment violations,
because he distrusted the state judiciaries' ability to protect prison-
ers' civil rights:
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1994).
59. See Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 197.
60. Id. at 201-02 (citations omitted).
61. See id. at 203-04.
62. 2 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self Reliance, in THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 33 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1979)
(1841).
63. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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State judges popularly elected may have difficulty resisting
popular pressures not experienced by federal judges given
lifetime tenure designed to immunize them from such influ-
ences, and the federal habeas statutes reflect the congres-
sional judgment that such detached federal review is a
salutary safeguard against any detention of an individual "in
violation of the Constitution or laws ...of the United
States.
' 64
Yet, one year later, in his law review article, State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights,65 he appealed to state judici-
aries to look to their state constitutions to encompass rights not cov-
ered by the federal constitution,66 and wrote:
[D]ecisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dis-
positive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by coun-
terpart provisions of state law. Accordingly, such decisions
are not mechanically applicable to state law issues ....
[S]tate court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scru-
tinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if
they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned,
paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying
specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim
persuasive weight as guideposts when interpreting counter-
part state guarantees.
67
In these two instances, Justice Brennan appears to have both
distrusted and endorsed the state judiciaries. However, this anomaly
may be reconciled by the Brennan art of judging: The right reason-
ing is that which advances social welfare; in this instance, the cause
of personal liberty.
In the end, the legacy of the Brennan art of judging comes to
this: He would achieve law's utilitarian purpose by promulgating an
appropriate declaration of "public policy" or "social welfare" in the
guise of interpreting a clause of the Constitution or a Congressional
statute.
64. Id. at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
66. See id. at 502-03.
67. Id. at 502.
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Unfortunately, the task of declaring what is appropriate "public
policy" or "social welfare" permits no easy definition. Like beauty,
desirable "public policy" or appropriate "social welfare" rests in the
eye of the beholder. To formulate what is deemed desirable public
policy or appropriate social welfare is like turning to a jurispruden-
tial genie for assistance. However, once the genie is released from
its bottle, it is not easily confined and takes on many hues and per-
mutations.
We see the genie at work in today's Supreme Court. The Jus-
tices have adopted the Brennan method of proclaiming what is and
what is not appropriate or desirable.68 But, the Brennan methodol-
ogy and its subsequent use by the present Court meet at an intersec-
tion with a resounding crash demonstrating the danger of relying on
community standards instead of hefty, hearty legal rules and princi-
ples.
69
In assessing the Brennan legacy on the art of judging, we cannot
overstate the care that is necessary in selecting judges today. Result-
oriented judges must be chosen with particular care. Thus, we need
not interest ourselves with a judge's behavior on the bench, his or her
judicial temperament, the darling consideration urged by lawyers
who want a judge who is tasteless, odorless and colorless. Rather, it
is more important to know the prospective judge's philosophy, the
judge'sjurisprudential temperament.
68. The current Court's approach can be seen most clearly in cases involv-
ing legislation aimed at benefiting traditionally disadvantaged minorities.
Where Justice Brennan used result-oriented methodology to expand constitu-
tional protections for minorities, the current Court uses the same approach as a
basis for holding that "equal protection" means that all people should be
treated equally under the law, and that any legislation that singles out a certain
group for special treatment will be subjected to a heightened level of constitu-
tional scrutiny. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) (holding that an affirmative action plan in case of minority set-asides
for guardrail contract is subject to strict scrutiny); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993) (holding that the legislative apportionment scheme was so irregular on
its face that it could only have resulted from race-conscious gerrymandering);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding unconsti-
tutional an affirmative action plan that required city to award percentage of
subcontracts to minority business enterprises).
69. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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There is an enormous difference between judicial temperament
and jurisprudential temperament. Some judges have lower thresh-
olds than others, and are more inclined to find solace in shades and
fringes rather than the black letter law. But, when they adjudicate in
this manner, it means that they have exhausted the guidance that
hefty, hearty precedents can provide, and feel they must turn to other
resources. These resources are found in the body of broad moral
standards that form the basis of legal philosophy.70 For this, we look
to the observations of Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter V. Shae-
fer:
If [the judge] views the role of the court as a passive one, he
will be willing to delegate the responsibility for change, and
he will not greatly care whether the delegated authority is
exercised or not. If he views the court as an instrument of
society designed to reflect in its decisions the morality of
the community, he will be more likely to look precedent in
the teeth and to measure it against the ideals and the aspira-
tions of his time.
7'
Thus is presented the problem when practitioners of the judicial
process move from legal rules and legal principles in the gradual tra-
dition of the common law to sudden bold new interpretations that
find justification only in newly-defined public policy.
B. The Emergence of Divergent Views: Using Brennan's Decision-
Making Methodology to Advance an Altered Justification
We now come to the final dimension of the Brennan legacy:
His art of judging may produce extremely fragile results subject to
the jurisprudential temperament of those who sit on the Court. So-
ciological jurisprudence now seems enshrined as a legitimate and
appropriate tool in decision-making and decision-justifying. The
methodology and the techniques of making the decisions have
70. See RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 37 (1977). Pro-
fessor Dworkin suggested that when this occurs, the decision depends "on the
judge's own preferences amongst a sea of respectable extra-legal standards,
any one in principle eligible, because if that were the case we could not say
that any rules were binding." Id.
71. Walter V. Shaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CI. L. REv. 3, 23
(1966).
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remained constant, but they are being used by new judges who have
different views of public policy, changed concepts of what consti-
tutes "the standards of right conduct," and "the mores of the commu-
nity," and changed ideas of "the social ideals of the community."
Consequently, the results fashioned by those implements have
shifted dramatically. Although Brennan's methodology was result-
oriented, his legacy has not preserved the results that it attained in
the past. Instead, his legacy is the present Court's use of his meth-
odology to reach decisions in which Justice Brennan never would
have joined.72
Thus, we see the danger of any judicial process that is based
primarily on the notion of proper public policy and desirable social
welfare. Chanting the mantra, "What was good for Justice Brennan
is good enough for us," the Court's new majority brings the method-
ology to full flower. While the method may be in full flower, the re-
sults advocated by William J. Brennan, Jr. are wilted and decom-
posing.
The Brennan methodology seems enshrined as a legitimate and
appropriate tool in decision-making and decision-justifying, largely
due to Justice Brennan's brilliant use of it. This is what we can de-
scribe as "How we do it." But, "How we do it" was only one half of
the judicial process that he employed. The other half is what we may
call "Why we do it," or more specifically stated, why sociological ju-
risprudence was utilized instead of adhering to the common law tra-
dition of decision-making and decision-justifying. In the Brennan
legacy, "How we do it" was used for a deliberate purpose-to im-
prove the quality of human life among those who were disenfran-
chised, those who felt powerless in the criminal justice system, those
who suffered from employment discrimination, and those who en-
dured the daily pain of social and neighborhood ostracism.
There was always a reason for defining new concepts, always a
reason for "Why we do it," for abrogating past decisions and past
philosophies, and for plowing new ground. And if we can concede,
as we must, that the Brennan techniques were utilized to advance the
cause of the voiceless and the oppressed because the other branches
of government had failed to protect basic rights, we must then
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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question whether it is legitimate to utilize these same techniques to-
day when persuasive reasons are not given for their use,73 and when
no identifiable explanation is set forth to depart from traditional deci-
sion-making techniques, including orthodox criteria of when to de-
part from precedents. 74 This is the critical question when we con-
sider the Brennan art of judging. We can ask whether the
implements of decision used to achieve political equality and social
as well as economic justice may legitimately be used when no pur-
pose has been stated to depart from the common law tradition of in-
cremental judicial law making, and when the methodology is em-
ployed for reasons other than to better the plight of the traditionally
disadvantaged.
V. CONCLUSION
Wholesale judicial declarations of public policy and social wel-
fare-as envisioned by Holmes, Pound, Cardozo and Brennan-were
not intended to supplant the common law tradition of principled de-
cision-making. There has to be what Holmes called "predictability
in the law,"75 and this is difficult, if not impossible, to find through
expression of idiosyncratic views of desirable social welfare. Per-
haps we are seeing too much of it today. Perhaps we are seeing too
much decision-making decided "by the size of the Chancellor's foot"
and not seeing sufficient expressions of adequate judicial reasoning,
but only a naked statement of a judge's own preferences in a sea of
extralegal standards.
73. Surely, "reasons" are being stated in these race-related cases, but the
jury is still out on whether these may be called "persuasive reasons." Thus in
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993), we are told:
[R]eapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything
other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race injures vot-
ers in other ways. It reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to un-
dermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to
elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than
their constituency as a whole.
Id. at 650.
74. For when to depart from precedent, see cases collected in Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 501 U.S. 808, 848-49 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and in Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265. 270-71 (1995).
75. Davis, supra note 7, at 896.
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Good reason is the only support for judicially-created law.
Where good reason is absent, the rule of law is always suspect. Per-
haps Justice Felix Frankfurter said it best upon his retirement after
twenty-three years on the Court: "[F]ragile as reason is and limited
as law is as the expression as the institutionalized medium of reason,
that's all we have standing between us and the tyranny of mere will
and the cruelty of unbridled, undisciplined feeling."
76
William J. Brennan, Jr.'s genius was that he combined the "me-
dium of reason"' with total faithfulness to an end-in-view of law, de-
scribed as "the establishment and maintenance of a social environ-
ment in which the quality of human life can be spirited, improving
and unimpaired., 77 He was more than a patron of the interplay be-
tween morality and law in modem legal thought; he was its care-
taker. His legacy then finds majesty in the words of Professor Calvin
Woodard:
What better measure is there of the value of a legal system,
or indeed of the rule of law, itself, than the quality of life of
those subject to it? And, if this approach stresses the mo-
rality of results, it also puts a huge moral burden on the
hand that wields the tool of law.
78
76. Felix Frankfurter, Between Us and Tyranny, TIME, Sept. 7, 1962, at 15.
77. Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 319 n.14 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Harry
W. Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1025
(1974)).
78. Woodard, supra note 21, at 796.
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